Electronically Stored Information: Balancing Free Discovery With Limits on Abuse by Groot, Patricia
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION:  
BALANCING FREE DISCOVERY  
WITH LIMITS ON ABUSE 
PATRICIA GROOT1
ABSTRACT 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) have long 
sought to limit abuses that developed under the traditional 
presumption favoring free discovery.  The 2006 amendments to the 
Rules are specifically aimed at curbing abuses associated with 
electronically stored information (ESI), which has become the 
basic medium of business communications and has provided 
businesses with overall productivity benefits.  The 2006 
amendments introduce a new category of electronic evidence that is 
“not reasonably accessible” and allow a court to shift the related 
costs of discovery to the party requesting the information.  Cost-
shifting, however, creates an incentive for businesses to shelter 
sensitive data by making it “not reasonably accessible.”  This 
iBrief argues that the current tests created by the courts for cost-
shifting should be reassessed and should include a benefit-shifting 
component that offsets business savings from using ESI as a 
storage medium.  Rather than treating ESI as exceptional, the 
Rules should adopt a uniform approach that curbs abuses of all 
discovery. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 As businesses have begun to keep most records as electronically 
stored information (ESI), scholars and practitioners have debated how 
liberal electronic discovery (e-discovery) standards should be.2  
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) have 
sought to reduce the “uncertainty, expense, delays and burdens” created by 
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discovering volumes of electronic data.3  Reformers amended the discovery 
Rules in 1983, 1993, and 2000 to limit abuses that developed under the 
traditional presumption favoring free discovery.4  In 2006, further 
amendments focused on e-discovery and introduced a new but undefined 
category of electronic evidence that is “not reasonably accessible.”5  The 
amended Rule 26 requires the requesting party to make certain showings 
before being granted discovery.6  Even then, a court may shift the costs of 
discovery, compelling the party requesting the documents to pay some or all 
of the costs of production.  Cost-shifting existed before 2006 as a matter of 
judicial discretion, but the commentary to the amended Rules expressly  
incorporates the term for the first time, which may encourage using cost-
shifting to limit e-discovery inappropriately. 
¶2 This iBrief argues that ESI, which has become the basic medium of 
business communications, should not be subject to media-specific discovery 
limitations.  Businesses make storage decisions taking many factors into 
consideration, including the prospect of litigation.  To bias that decision by 
limiting discovery for a particular medium because it is less accessible 
would invite sheltering of sensitive data.  As a result, companies may 
purposely store potentially adverse data in a way that limits its discovery. 
¶3 This iBrief further argues that the multifactor tests for cost-shifting 
encouraged by the 2006 amendments and previously formulated in cases 
including Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.7 and 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake I)8 should be reassessed in 
light of current information management technology.  This iBrief 
recommends that courts should interpret the “reasonably accessible” 
provision broadly and presume most ESI reasonably accessible, even if kept 
for backup purposes.  Courts should rarely permit exceptions to the rule that 
custodians bear production costs, and any cost-shifting should include a 
benefit-shifting component that offsets business savings from using ESI as 
the storage medium.  Rather than treating e-discovery as exceptional, the 
Rules should address abusive discovery as a separate issue. 
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I. BENEFITS OF ESI 
¶4 Commentators have warned that making ESI freely discoverable 
would be too costly and inconvenient.9  Businesses increasingly use ESI, 
however, reflecting its overall advantages despite these discovery-related 
concerns. 
¶5 ESI’s prevalence10 reflects the transition to computers for 
processing business information to realize productivity benefits.11  
Businesses benefit from digitizing information—converting it into a form 
computers recognize12—in many ways, ranging from better communication 
with customers to more efficient storage.13  In addition, all businesses are 
subject to requirements to retain proper records,14 and storing that 
information electronically is less costly.15  In short, digitizing intellectual 
property improves efficiency and reduces costs for businesses.16 
                                                     
9 See Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery 
Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 67–68 (2007) (“[E-]discovery is more time-
consuming, more burdensome, and more costly than conventional discovery.”); 
Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 
561, 592 (2001) (“[E]lectronic discovery can be predicted, as a general matter, 
to give rise to burdens and expense that are of a completely different magnitude 
from those encountered in traditional discovery.”). 
10 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
11 See, e.g., Eric Brynjolfsson & Lorin M. Hitt, Computing Productivity: Firm-
Level Evidence 26–27 (MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4210-01, 2003), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=290325 (stating that computers provide a 
substantial long-term contribution to productivity growth); Bernanke Discusses 
Productivity, Not Inflation, in Commencement Address, USA TODAY, June 9, 
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/fed/2006-06-09-bernanke-
mit_x.htm (“America’s strong productivity performance has been bolstered . . . 
by the greater use of computers . . . .”). 
12 See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal 
Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 333–34 (2000) 
(explaining how computers store information in binary form). 
13 See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985) (mem.) 
(“From the largest corporations to the smallest families, people are using 
computers to cut costs, improve production, enhance communication, store 
countless data and improve capabilities . . . .”). 
14 See In re Prudential Inc. of Am. Sales Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 617 (D.N.J. 
1997) (criticizing the absence of a comprehensive document-retention policy 
that “impede[s] the litigation process and merit[s] imposition of sanctions”). 
15 See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (mem.) (“With electronic media . . . costs of storage are 
virtually nil.”). 
16  Barrie Locke, Case Study: Sony’s Digital Realm, AIIM E-DOC MAG., 
May/June 2007, at 55, available at http://www.aiim-
digital.org/aiim/20070506/?pg=57 (“Sony Pictures Entertainment has amassed 
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¶6 Businesses deciding how to store information consider more than 
the cost benefits from digital storage.  They also value technology that 
enables searching, organizing, and retrieving ESI, which makes daily 
business operations easier.17  The prospect of litigation imposes similar 
demands to make information accessible in an organized, orderly manner.18  
Although responding to discovery involves substantial costs, businesses 
derive independent benefits from storing and organizing records 
electronically.  In sum, the benefits businesses enjoy from ESI justify 
investing substantial capital in such technology.19 
II. ESI AND COST-SHIFTING UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
¶7 Historically, federal courts have permitted broad discovery under 
the Rules, recognizing that “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts 
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”20  Parties 
responding to discovery requests had to bear the expense of complying with 
those requests, subject only to an exception for discovery imposing “undue 
burden or expense” on responding parties,21 an exception courts applied 
                                                                                                                       
an enormous digital library . . . as a creative repository for its worldwide 
marketing teams across business units . . . to share media assets and accelerate 
the servicing, distribution, approval, and print workflows associated with 
entertainment marketing.”). 
17 See Bryant Duhon, Managing Documents and Email at the National 
Geographic Society, AIIM E-DOC MAG., March/April 2007, at 52, available at 
http://www.aiim-digital.org/aiim/20070304/?pg=54 (“[I]f we can’t find an email 
because it’s lost in this morass of 10GB email boxes, then we may lose some 
negotiated right to intellectual property or we may have to repeatedly repay to 
use a photo that we actually have the right to use. Keeping the right email is 
extremely important to us.”). 
18 See Wagner v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 606, 610 (D. Neb. 2001) (mem.) 
(“[P]roducing large amount of documents in no apparent order does not comply 
with a party’s obligation under Rule 34.”); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home 
Indem. Co., No. 88-9752, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8304, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. June 
17, 1991) (mem.) (finding that the peculiar manner in which a party maintained 
records and its computer system did not excuse it from burdensome and costly 
production). 
19 See Steve Lohr, The Economy Transformed, Bit by Bit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 
1999, http://partners.nytimes.com/library/financial/122099outlook-econ.html 
(reporting that businesses invest $380 billion per year in computers, up from 
$110 billion five years previously, and that this figure probably will continue to 
increase). 
20 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); accord Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 
340, 358 (1978). 
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narrowly.22  This combination of allowing one party to enjoy liberal 
discovery while having the other party pay the related costs invited abuse, 
and various amendments to the Rules were enacted from 1983 through 2000 
to discourage overuse of discovery.23 
¶8 As ESI became more widespread, lawmakers labored to incorporate 
ESI into a legal system that was established when record keeping was 
verbal or written.24  In 2006, the Rules were amended to reduce 
inconsistency and to develop a national set of rules for ESI in federal 
courts.25  The drafters fit ESI into the existing system, resisting requests to 
impose additional mandatory limitations on ESI. 
¶9 Nevertheless, the 2006 amendments had one potentially restrictive 
effect on e-discovery: for the first time, the Rules explicitly imposed 
limitations, including making cost-shifting available, for discovery of ESI 
that is “not reasonably accessible.”26  If courts widely impose cost-shifting, 
it may change the practice of liberal discovery just as effectively as any 
mandatory limitations. 
A. The 1983–2000 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
¶10 In 1983, language was added to Rule 26(b)(2)(C) that 
commentators have characterized as a “radical departure from the free and 
easy days of liberal discovery.”27  The added language, known as the 
proportionality test, directs that discovery “shall be limited” if certain 
conditions exist, including if discovery is “unduly burdensome or 
expensive.”28  The limitation was intended to prevent significant abuse, 
such as the use of discovery “as a device to coerce a party.”29 
¶11 In 1993 and 2000, the Committee on the Rules of Practice and 
Procedure made additional, similarly motivated amendments to procedural 
rules governing discovery.  These amendments included mandatory 
conferences to develop a plan for disclosure and the separation of 
                                                     
22 See, e.g., Adelman v. Nordberg Mfg. Co., 6 F.R.D. 383, 384 (E.D. Wis. 1947) 
(“It is not a valid objection that the [discovery request] will necessitate large 
expenditures of time and money by defendant if in other respects the 
information sought is a proper object of discovery.”). 
23 See infra Part II.A. 
24 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (2004) (stating that a contract for the sale of goods 
for $5,000 or more must be in writing). 
25 See infra Part II.B. 
26 See infra Part II.B. 
27 Noyes, supra note 9, at 56. 
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
29 Id. 26(b) advisory committee’s note. 
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discoverable material into two classes: one that is freely discoverable if it 
“is relevant to the claim or defense of any party” and another that meets a 
lesser standard of relevance “to the subject matter involved in the action” 
and is discoverable only upon a showing of “good cause.”30 
B. The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
¶12 Parties could discover ESI even before the 2006 amendments to the 
Rules, and perhaps no amendment was needed to make this explicit.31  The 
2006 amendments, however, create a new category32 of discoverable data 
that is “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”33  
Although the drafters of the 2006 amendments contemplated that the parties 
would agree on what data are within this third category before discovery 
begins,34 the amended Rules provide that, on a motion to compel discovery, 
a custodian resisting discovery must show that the requested discovery is 
“not reasonably accessible.”35  If the proposed discovery meets the “not 
reasonably accessible” standard, the requesting party then must show good 
cause, “considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C),” for the court to 
compel the resisting party to produce the ESI.  The court also may impose 
conditions,36 including cost-shifting, on the e-discovery.37 
¶13 The Rule 26(b)(2)(C) limitation referenced in the new rule is the 
same proportionality test that the 1983 amendments impose on all discovery 
requests.38  Judges have never applied that test to meaningfully limit 
discovery,39 and so it is unlikely judges will apply it more expansively for 
e-discovery.  Thus, commentators have observed that, if the purpose of the 
2006 amendments was to provide “additional protection against the cost and 
burden of discovery beyond that already available,”40 the addition of the 
good cause standard is “so vague that it is meaningless.”41 
¶14 Despite adding no new substantive bar to discovery of ESI, the 
2006 amendments provide two important advantages to parties resisting e-
                                                     
30 Noyes, supra note 9, at 57–61. 
31 See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV.2120 (LMM) (AJP), 
1995 WL 649934, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (“[I]t is black letter law that 
computerized data is discoverable if relevant.”). 
32 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
34 Id. 34(b) advisory committee’s note. 
35 Id. 26(b)(2)(B). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
38 See supra text accompanying note 28. 
39 Noyes, supra note 9, at 56–57. 
40 Id. at 73. 
41 Id. at 52. 
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discovery.  First, they permanently embedded the idea that some ESI is “not 
reasonably accessible” in the Rules, even though the technology that 
originally made ESI seem inaccessible is rapidly changing.  Second, they 
suggest that courts may impose conditions, including cost-shifting, 42 on 
discovery of ESI even after a party shows good cause to compel 
discovery.43 
¶15 By introducing the term “not reasonably accessible” the 2006 
amendments invite courts to revisit traditional doctrines of liberal discovery.  
Courts have applied various approaches to determine the scope of 
discovery, which the next Part discusses. 
III. CASE TRENDS IN COST-SHIFTING 
¶16 The 2006 amendments made only modest changes to prior practice 
under Rule 26, so prior cases regarding cost-shifting remain relevant in 
predicting the Rule’s future application.  At the risk of oversimplifying, one 
possible way to group courts’ various approaches is to divide them into 
three groups. 
¶17 First, some courts apply a bright-line rule that focuses on one or a 
few determinative factors.  The most common determining factor is which 
party chose the storage medium causing the production costs.  Second, 
some cases take an economics-based approach, which quantifies likely costs 
and benefits of production and then shifts costs according to the marginal 
utility of the document request.  Third, some cases apply a formula-based 
approach, sorting the particular facts of the case into a predetermined grid 
of multiple issues relevant to cost-shifting, often including those issues 
considered in the first two approaches. 
A. Bright Line Rule: Business Bound by Its Choice of Medium 
¶18 Applying a bright-line rule implies a simplistic determination based 
on one or a few issues, leaving no room for discretion in complex cases.  
Courts have cited In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust 
Litigation44 as creating a simplistic rule that courts cannot shift costs when 
                                                     
42 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note (suggesting that such 
conditions could include requiring a requesting party to pay part or all of the 
related costs). Previously, cost-shifting was based in courts’ implicit 
discretionary authority under Rule 26(c) to issue protective orders limiting 
discovery that creates “undue burden or expense.” Id. 
43 Id. 26(b)(2)(B). 
44 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 
997, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (mem.). 
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the costs result from a backup system a custodian of ESI has chosen.45  In 
this case, however, the court considered many factors before focusing on a 
few when deciding not to shift costs.46  In re Brand Name cited a series of 
cases that reached similar results.47  Rather than using a bright-line rule, 
these courts also considered multiple factors, including which party chose 
the backup system.48 
¶19 In re Brand Name was a consolidation of various antitrust actions 
by retail pharmacies against manufacturers and wholesalers of prescription 
drugs.49  During discovery, the plaintiffs asked the defendants to search and 
retrieve e-mails, some of which were indisputably relevant, from backup 
tapes.50  Four of the defendants complied without seeking cost-shifting.51  
One did not, estimating a cost of $50,000 to $70,000 and arguing that the 
plaintiff should bear this cost.52 
                                                     
45 Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (mem.). 
46 Id. 
47 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *2. 
48 E.g., Delozier v. First Nat’l Bank of Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (1986) 
(mem.); Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 75–76 (1976). For 
example, in Kozlowski, the minor plaintiff sustained severe burns when his 
pajamas ignited. Id. at 74. The plaintiff requested that the defendant, who 
manufactured and marketed the pajamas, produce “a record of all complaints 
and communications concerning personal injuries or death caused by the 
burning of children’s nightwear.” Id. The defendant objected and failed to 
comply with the request. Id. at 75. The court considered the relevance of the 
requested information, the plaintiff’s need for the documents, the defendant’s 
possession of them, and the plaintiff’s lack of alternate access to them. Id. at 75–
76. The court then concluded that “[t]he defendant may not excuse itself from 
compliance . . . by utilizing a system of record-keeping which conceals rather 
than discloses relevant records, or makes it unduly difficult to identify or locate 
them, thus rendering the production of documents an excessively burdensome 
and costly expedition.” Id. at 76. 
49 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 602 (7th 
Cir. 1997). 
50 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *1. 
51 Id. at *7. 
52 Id. at *3–4 (finding support for the defendant’s position in the Manual for 
Complex Litigation § 21.446 (2d ed.1993), which provided that “special 
expenses” incident to production of computerized data requested by a party were 
“typically” paid by that party). This claim of typicality in the Manual was 
dropped in the Fourth Edition, which now provides instead that courts should 
“minimize and allocate” such costs, with a preference for the former. MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446 (4th ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_l=/public/home.n
sf/inavgeneral?openpage&url_r=/public/home.nsf/pages/470. 
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¶20 The court considered the issue in terms of “undue burden,”53 
weighing the costs of retrieval against the principle that “if a party chooses 
an electronic storage method, the necessity for a retrieval program or 
method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk.”54  Agreeing that the estimated 
retrieval costs were high, the court nevertheless noted that the cost resulted 
from a system of keeping records over which they had no control.55  Not 
accepting the defendant’s request to shift a problem that it had caused to the 
other party, the court instead sought to lessen the problem by ordering the 
plaintiff to confer with the defendant to reduce the size of the request and to 
pay copying costs of the documents it would receive.56  Therefore, although 
In re Brand Name has been cited as a bright-line rule, its policy that 
seemingly favors parties seeking discovery might be better understood as a 
rebuttable presumption. 
¶21 In re Brand Name and the cases the court cited are not alone in 
reflecting “well established law” that a party should pay costs associated 
with “unwieldy” record systems it has chosen.57  Yet it is hard to find recent 
discovery opinions based on this law, likely because most courts have 
adopted a broader, formula-based approach that incorporates a variety of 
factors, which Section C discusses,58 including economic considerations, 
which Section B discusses. 
B. Economics-Based Approach 
¶22 McPeek v. Ashcroft59 articulated an economics-based approach to 
determine cost-shifting in e-discovery.  A federal employee claimed 
                                                     
53 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *5; 
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (providing for protective orders from undue 
burden in discovery). 
54 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *5. 
55 Id. at *6. 
56 Id. at *7–8. 
57 Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., Civ. A. No. 88-9752, 
1991 WL 111040, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 1991) (mem.); see also Kaufman 
v. Kinko’s Inc., No. Civ.A. 18894-NC, 2002 WL 32123851, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
16, 2002) (“Upon installing a data storage system, it must be assumed that at 
some point in the future one may need to retrieve the information previously 
stored.”); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (mem.) (stating that, by using backup technology, the 
defendant assumed the risk that it would have to produce the information). 
58 See infra Part III.C; see also Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 
634 (D. Kan. 2006) (mem.) (“The Court is not aware of any decision since 
[Zubulake I] that unequivocally prohibits cost-shifting where the Defendant 
voluntarily utilized storage technology that is difficult to access or restore.”). 
59 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 2001) (mem.). 
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retaliation based on his prior claim of sexual harassment.60  The plaintiff 
wanted the defendant to search backup tapes for evidence of retaliatory 
motives in deleted e-mails.61  The court considered the defendant’s 
objection that this process was too costly under the “undue burden or 
expense” standard of Rule 26(c).62 
¶23 The court began by rejecting the bright-line rule of In re Brand 
Name, stating that In re Brand Name’s order for the custodian to pay for 
backup restoration relied on the mistaken assumption that using electronic 
storage requires adequate retrieval capability.63  The McPeek court also 
rejected In re Brand Name’s assumption that businesses could find an 
alternative to using backup tape, stating that no alternative exists in 
contemporary business.64  This rejection has two problems.  First, the 
custodian likely chose the e-mail system for use in everyday communication 
rather than for its backup capabilities.  The e-mail system, therefore, may 
not have adequate backup or retrieval capabilities.65  Second, alternatives to 
inaccessible backup tape exist, as do optional technologies that enable cost-
effective retrieval from backup tape.66 
¶24 The McPeek court instead applied a “marginal utility” test that 
assumed that “[t]he more likely it is that the backup tape contains 
information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the 
[custodian] search at its own expense.”67  Suggesting that Rule 26(c) 
                                                     
60 Id. at 31–32. 
61 Id. at 31–33. 
62 Id. at 34. 
63 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 
997, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *5 (mem.). 
64 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 33 (“What alternative is there? Quill pens?”). 
65 Compare In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, 
at *5 (“[I]f a party chooses an electronic storage system, the necessity for a 
retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk.”), with id. at *6 
(“[Defendant] essentially admits that part of the burden attendant to searching its 
storage files results from ‘the limitations of the software [it] is using.’” (quoting 
Affidavit of Paul G. Keegan at 7, In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 
LEXIS 8281 (No. 94 C 897, MDL 9897))). 
66 See Benjamin D. Silbert, Comment, The 2006 Amendments to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure: Accessible and Inaccessible Electronic Information Storage 
Devices, Why Parties Should Store Electronic Data in Accessible Formats, 
RICH. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2007, art. 14, at 23, 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i3/article14.pdf (“[A]s accessible electronic 
information storage devices (ATA disks, large hard drives, online backup 
services, etc.) become the norm, it remains to be seen how much cost-shifting 
occurs, if any, when a party decides to store discoverable information in an 
inaccessible format.”). 
67 McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34. 
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protective orders should weigh cost against the probability of finding 
something relevant, the court ordered a “test run” of backup e-mails from 
the computer of the plaintiff’s supervisor for a one-year period.68  The court 
directed the parties to return when the test was completed to argue whether 
the costs and benefits of this search justified further retrieval.69  Although 
few courts have followed McPeek’s holding alone, the decision remains 
significant because courts incorporated its analysis into the dominant 
formula-based approach Section C discusses.70 
C. Formula-Based Determinations 
¶25 Bills v. Kennecott Corp71 is a useful, early example of a court-
assembled list of multiple factors courts can weigh when deciding ESI cost 
allocation.  The opinion noted four factors persuasive in denying cost-
shifting: (1) the overall cost would not be large, (2) the cost would be 
greater for the plaintiff than for the defendant, (3) the cost would be a 
substantial burden to the plaintiffs, and (4) the party making the discovery 
request would derive some benefit from the data to be produced.72  Two 
additional persuasive factors considered in Bills but sometimes omitted 
from summaries of its holding73 are: (1) “information stored in computers 
should be as freely discoverable as information not stored in computers, so 
parties requesting discovery should not be prejudiced thereby; and (2) the 
party responding is usually in the best and most economical position to call 
up its own computer stored data.”74  The latter two factors suggest a 
presumption against parties seeking cost-shifting. 
¶26 This presumption against cost-shifting changed in Rowe 
Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.,75 in which the court 
arrived at a somewhat different list: 
 (1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of 
discovering critical information; (3) the availability of such 
information from other sources; (4) the purposes for which the 
responding party maintains the requested data; (5) the relative benefit 
                                                     
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake I), 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that the first two Zubulake I factors comprise the 
marginal utility test McPeek described). 
71 Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 459 (D. Utah 1985) (mem.). 
72 Id. at 464. 
73 See, e.g., Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 360 (listing only the four 
factors). 
74 Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 463–64. 
75 Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (mem.). 
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to the parties of obtaining the information; (6) the total cost associated 
with production; (7) the relative ability of each party to control costs 
and its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources available to each 
party.76
The Rowe factors reversed the earlier presumption against cost-shifting.77
¶27 One reason for this reversal was the effect of Rowe’s sixth factor, 
the cost of production, which “is almost always an objectively large number 
in cases where litigating cost-shifting is worthwhile.”78  Therefore, the court 
in Zubulake I slightly revised the Rowe formula to include the following 
factors: 
 (1) [t]he extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover 
relevant information; (2) [t]he availability of such information from 
other sources; (3) [t]he total cost of production, compared to the 
amount in controversy; (4) [t]he total cost of production, compared to 
the resources available to each party, (5) [t]he relative ability of each 
party to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) [t]he importance of 
the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) [t]he relative benefits to the 
parties of obtaining the information.79
The Zubulake I formula compensates for the Rowe pro-shifting bias by 
evaluating production costs, not in absolute terms, but rather in relation to the 
resources of the parties.  Yet Zubulake I did not adequately acknowledge the 
overriding tradition of free discovery that has historically justified reluctance to 
extend cost-shifting, which In re Brand Name and Bills articulated.80  In fact, 
the Zubulake I court eliminated the one Rowe factor that might acknowledge 
these principles, the fourth factor, which considers the purpose for which a 
responding party retained the information.81  The fact that the responding party 
managed data storage in the course of its business seems highly relevant to a 
decision to leave related costs of retrieval with the responding party, because 
the cost of retrieval will likely be offset by the benefits derived from using the 
system in its daily business. 
¶28 Numerous cases have applied the Rowe or Zubulake I formulas, 
sometimes slightly changing the groupings of various factors, with varying 
                                                     
76 Id. at 429. 
77 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[O]f the handful of reported opinions that apply Rowe or 
some modification thereof, all of them have ordered the cost of discovery to be 
shifted to the requesting party.”). 
78 Id. at 321. 
79 Id. at 322. 
80 See supra notes 57, 74 and accompanying text. 
81 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321–22. 
2009 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 2 
results.82  These cases incorporate the economics-based insights of McPeek 
into a complex analysis that dilutes the principles of free discovery 
underlying earlier decisions that discouraged cost-shifting, such as In re 
Brand Name.  These factor-based tests, however, overlook a crucial fact: the 
custodian chose the particular data-storage and search-and-retrieval 
methods because they offered business benefits despite inefficiencies in 
litigation, and thus custodians with these inefficient retrieval mechanisms 
voluntarily accepted the related litigation costs. 
IV. PROPOSALS TO REFORM COST-SHIFTING 
¶29 This Part advances three proposals that modify the formula-based 
approach in a way that both honors traditional, liberal discovery principles 
and limits the abuses associated with free discovery.  To achieve this 
balance, courts should (1) eliminate the marginal utility test, (2) shift 
benefits as well as costs, and (3) discontinue media-based restrictions. 
A. Eliminate the Marginal Utility Test 
¶30 The marginal utility test suffers from several weaknesses.  First, the 
test requires courts to predict how beneficial discovery will be before the 
discovery actually takes place.83  A test run to estimate utility as suggested 
in McPeek is an inexact substitute for full knowledge.84 
¶31 Second, the numerical test is biased toward quantity rather than 
quality.  Marginal utility cannot measure the possibility of finding one key 
“smoking gun,” which is fairly common in e-mail discovery.85  McPeek 
ignores the value of computerized discovery in this respect, dismissing the 
possibility of finding a needle in a haystack,86 which is precisely the sort of 
task computers can perform economically.87 
¶32 Third, the marginal utility test focuses on utility only at the micro 
level rather than the macro level.  The actual economic benefits of an 
expensive backup procedure can best be measured from the perspective of 
the complete computerized business operation into which the procedure is 
                                                     
82 See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 573 (N.D. Ill. 
2004) (mem.) (applying a slightly modified version of the Zubulake I factors). 
83 See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323 (“[S]uch proof will rarely exist in advance 
of obtaining the requested discovery.”). 
84 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
85 See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 312 n.8 (describing an employee who, 
after alleging retaliatory firing, found an e-mail suggesting she be fired to avoid  
paying a bonus after she filed an EEOC complaint). 
86 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (mem.). 
87 See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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integrated, an effect that courts can consider in the context of benefit-
shifting, which Section B discusses. 
B. Consider Broader Benefit-Shifting 
¶33 The Zubulake I court characterized the seventh factor—the relative 
benefits to the parties—as the “least important” factor.88  Yet this factor lets 
courts consider not only how much the requestor will benefit from the ESI 
(which favors cost shifting), but also how much the responding party 
benefits generally from its computerized storage system (which disfavors 
cost-shifting).  The business’s general benefits from a computerized storage 
system transcend the high-cost, low-benefit function of backup storage and 
retrieval89 and encompass the overall productivity benefits gained by 
managing data electronically.90  Such a calculation would likely show that 
occasional retrieval costs of ESI previously transferred to backup tape are a 
small and necessary part of foreseeable computer-related expenditures.91  
Retrieval of ESI in discovery is a cost of doing business and should come as 
no surprise to large or small businesses.92  Businesses budget, or should 
budget, for such expenditures as part of a general commitment to have a 
complete and productive computer operation. 
¶34 Even if benefit shifting is restricted to account only for data-storage 
operations, the seventh factor should recognize savings realized by a 
responding party that uses an inexpensive backup system rather than more 
expensive, and more accessible, media.93  The responding party made a 
business decision when it opted for an inexpensive backup system over a 
more expensive but more accessible system with lower retrieval costs.  
Thus, courts should balance the high retrieval costs associated with an 
                                                     
88 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322.  For a list of the Zubulake I factors, see text 
accompanying note 79. 
89 See supra Part I. 
90 See supra Part I. 
91 See supra note 19. 
92 See Jennifer Schiff, Rules About to Change in E-Discovery Game, 
ENTERPRISESTORAGEFORUM.COM, Nov. 7, 2006, 
http://www.enterprisestorageforum.com/continuity/features/article.php/3642421
(stating that a 2005 law firm study showed that companies with at least $1 
billion in annual revenue were involved in an average of 147 lawsuits at any one 
time, while the corresponding number for companies with revenues under $1 
billion was thirty-seven). 
93 See Stephen J. Bigelow, Tape Backup Overview, SEARCHSTORAGE.CO.UK, 
Aug. 7, 2007, 
http://searchstorage.techtarget.co.uk/news/article/0,289142,sid181_gci1292227,
00.html (“Although tape performance is relatively slow, tape fits well into the 
storage architecture, because it allows users to store a large volume of data at a 
reasonable price.”). 
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inexpensive but less accessible backup system against the savings gained by 
the responding party when it initially purchases that system.  Unless 
responding parties who initially purchase inexpensive systems are forced to 
internalize the costs of using those systems, there is no incentive for a 
company to use anything but the least expensive, least technologically 
efficient, and least accessible system. 
¶35 In assessing benefits under the seventh factor, one may consider the 
drafters’ concern that creating this category of ESI would lead corporations 
to “make[] information ‘inaccessible’ because it is likely to be discoverable 
in litigation.”94  Although the drafters felt that existing provisions for 
sanctions would take care of this concern,95 some abusive actions do not 
justify sanctions.  Thus, the Supreme Court observed that nonsanctionable 
actions to keep documents out of the hands of others “are common in 
business.”96 
¶36 These actions are often legal and may even be prudent business 
strategies.  In any case, it would be difficult to prove a business’s motive for 
choosing a particular ESI storage medium.97  Rather than demand that a 
requesting party prove a suspected motive,98 it may be more efficient 
simply to interpret Zubulake I’s seventh factor as weighing against cost-
shifting whenever a business has a more accessible alternative to using a 
                                                     
94 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE U.S., supra note 3, at 32. 
95 Id. 
96 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005). 
97 But see Posting of Paladin to ExDHL, 
http://exdhl.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=757 (Sept. 10, 2005, 12:29 PM) 
(“[Despite better alternatives,] some companies continue using backup tapes 
because they fear that online archiving will create more discoverable data, 
according to [one software consultant].”). 
98 See Robert Allan Eisenberg, Proactive on Backups, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 2005, 
http://www.doar.com/apps/uploads/literature22_NYLJ_Back-up_Tapes.pdf 
(suggesting that prospective responding parties should discontinue using backup 
tapes for purposes other than backup to avoid courts classifying the tape as 
accessible). Courts conducting cost-shifting inquiries must diligently watch for 
possible gaming. See CRAIG BALL, WHAT JUDGES SHOULD KNOW ABOUT 
DISCOVERY FROM BACKUP TAPES 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.craigball.com/What_Judges_Should_Know_About_Discovery_from
_Backup_Tapes-corrected.pdf (urging courts to inquire, (1) Does the responding 
party sometimes restore backup tapes to ensure proper system function or to 
retrieve mistakenly deleted files? (2) Have these backup tapes been restored in 
other circumstances? (3) Does the responding party have the in-house capacity 
to restore the data? (4) Are search and extraction technologies available that do 
not require wholesale tape restoration? (5) Are cheaper outside restoration 
services available?). 
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less accessible medium99 because the business derived the overall 
productivity benefits associated with managing data electronically.100 
C. Courts Should Not Use Cost Allocation to Control Abusive 
Discovery 
¶37 Abusive discovery is a long-standing problem, and courts did not 
condone it even when applying traditional doctrines of liberal discovery.101  
Considerable efforts to address the abuses have been made over the past 
twenty years, with approaches that apply uniformly to all media forms.102  
Although commentators have argued that ESI is particularly susceptible to 
abuse,103 drafters of the 2006 amendments concluded that changing the 
rules only for a particular data-storage medium is not the best way to 
control discovery abuses that exist for all media.104  In fact, the capacity of 
computers to quickly search large quantities of ESI has the potential to 
reduce the burdens of discovery.105  Judge Scheindlin gives an instructive 
example: e-mail messages revealed a party’s plan to force a favorable 
settlement by running up discovery costs, which was critical in a jury’s 
deliberations.106 
¶38 If abusive discovery is a problem, it should be corrected through 
measures directed at all abusive practices, not merely those involving e-
discovery.  Discovery that is intended to coerce settlement, or that is unduly 
burdensome or expensive under the proportionality rule applicable across 
media forms,107 should be prohibited altogether, rather than subjected to 
                                                     
99 For a list of alternative backup systems, see supra note 66. 
100 See Jake Frazier, Are Market Forces and Technological Advances Already 
Making the “Reasonably Accessible” Category Obsolete?, DIGITAL DISCOVERY 
& E-EVIDENCE, May 2005, 
http://www.renewdata.com/pdf/Pike_&_Fischer_article_reprint_May_05.pdf 
(“If the rules accord information on ‘backup tapes’ an extra layer of protection 
from discovery, for example, then perhaps corporations might be encouraged to 
use antiquated techniques for a strategic advantage.”). 
101 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (warning against 
examinations “conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, 
embarrass or oppress”). 
102 See supra Part II.A. 
103 See supra note 9. 
104 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE U.S., supra note 3, at 21–38. 
105 See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 344 (giving the example of what 
would be one thousand hours of billable document review time completed in 
minutes). 
106 Id. at 339 n.42. 
107 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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cost-shifting.  The court in Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc.108 
pointed to a basic flaw of simply using cost-shifting in such a case: “There 
is something inconsistent with our notions of fairness to allow one party to 
obtain a heightened level of discovery because it is willing to pay for it.”109 
CONCLUSION 
¶39 Effective management of ESI has let businesses store and 
communicate information much more efficiently.  ESI has also affected the 
discovery process, however, raising concerns about the accessibility of data 
and the cost of retrieval.  From the 1980s on, various amendments have 
incorporated ESI into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Courts have 
also developed strategies to review discovery of ESI, such as economic- or 
formula-based approaches to balance the need for discovery of all relevant 
facts against the burden of retrieval.  Courts have been mindful of abusive 
discovery techniques that seek to raise the cost of retrieval as well as shift 
the costs, potentially affecting the outcomes of a particular case.  As the 
Rules and the courts have tried to incorporate ESI into the existing 
framework, new technological advances such as better retrieval mechanisms 
have changed the methods of storage and retrieval, requiring courts to add 
additional factors to review and balance e-discovery burdens. 
¶40 Previous concepts of “undue burden” and “not reasonably 
accessible” ESI may soon be outdated due to these advances, and courts 
will need to adjust previous approaches.  This iBrief’s recommendations 
provide a framework for future review.  First, eliminating the marginal 
utility test would preserve the full body of ESI for discovery purposes and 
allow the plaintiff to search for a “smoking gun” e-mail.  Second, benefit 
shifting allows the consideration of a broader range of items than cost-
shifting when evaluating the full cost of ESI.  Lastly, a uniform approach to 
curb abuses of all discovery would be more efficient and meaningful than 
focusing only on ESI.  As a whole, these recommendations would allow the 
courts to keep pace with ESI advancements while balancing discovery 
needs with proper limitations on abusive discovery practices. 
                                                     
108 Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A. 01CV10287RCL, 
2002 WL 32309413 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) (mem.) (rejecting a party’s request 
to examine voluminous backup tapes despite its offer to pay production costs). 
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